Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127338
Authors: 
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Jörg
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 529
Abstract: 
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Subjects: 
Imitate-the-best
learning
exact potential games
symmetric games
relative payoffs
zero-sum games
JEL: 
D43
C73
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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