Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127305
Authors: 
Duersch, Peter
Servátka, Maroš
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 485
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the risk-averse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and equally likely to punish in the second stage in either of the two punishment treatments.
Subjects: 
experiment
prisoner’s dilemma
punishment
risk aversion
uncertainty
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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