Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127294
Authors: 
Eichberger, Jürgen
Vinogradov, Dmitri
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 471
Abstract: 
Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auctions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Subjects: 
games
experiments
JEL: 
C71
C93
D01
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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