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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 467
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Most real world emission permit schemes are in effect hybrid instruments that feature both quantity and price controls. While the effects of price bounds are well understood for issues such as uncertain abatement costs it has not been investigated how such bounds affect time-consistency of environmental regulation and research incentives. The present paper analyzes these issues for two types of innovation. While price bounds increase static efficiency they reduce incentives to innovate. Commitment on details of a scheme’s design might be necessary to avoid the latter.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental Regulation
Hybrid Instruments
Innovation
Time-inconsistency
JEL: 
Q55
H23
O33
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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