Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127280
Authors: 
Damianov, Damian S.
Oechssler, Jörg
Becker, Johannes Gerd
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 460
Abstract: 
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.
Subjects: 
auctions
experiment
discriminatory
uniform
JEL: 
D44
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
361 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.