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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 461
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
Evolutionary game theory
Stochastic stability
Imita- tion
Cournot markets
Information
Experiments
Simulations
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D43
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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