Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127241 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 421
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We show that by dividing labour (assigning tasks to different agents and verifying that agents do not carry out tasks to which they are not assigned), it is possible for the principal to implement the efficient way of production. Colluding agents can undermine this implementation. However, if agents have different abilities, collusion can be prevented by a specific assignment of agents to tasks.
Schlagwörter: 
hidden action
moral hazard
specialisation
job design
JEL: 
L23
M52
D82
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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