Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127237
Authors: 
Perino, Grischa
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 426
Abstract: 
The performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa. This interaction is studied for a new type of innovation where new technologies reduce emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time cause a new type of damage. A robust finding is that the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent-holding firm. This result carries over to other types of innovation. Taxes are inefficient if technologies produce perfect substitutes and share all scarce inputs. Moreover, the optimal tax on pollution might be negative.
Subjects: 
Innovation
Environment
Instrument Choice
Patents
Monopoly Pricing
JEL: 
Q55
L5
H23
O3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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