Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127231
Authors: 
Hahn, Volker
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 413
Abstract: 
In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the politics they pursue. We assume that voters are fully rational but show reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may guarantee that a position closer to the the median voter’s position is adopted even when political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.
Subjects: 
Reciprocity
Voting
Median Voter Theorem
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
277.73 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.