Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127216
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 399
Abstract: 
We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.
Subjects: 
Competitive wage offers
remunerations of politicians
elections
free riding and under provision
incentive contracts
JEL: 
D70
D80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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