Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127100 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 908
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower is determined by the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty. If the weight is sufficiently low (high), then the relationship is a strategic substitute (complement), and the leader has a first-mover (dis)advantage, respectively. In the case of strategic complementarity, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.
Schlagwörter: 
Stackelberg games
Cournot games
First-mover and second-mover advantages
Public and private information
JEL: 
C72
D82
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
125.04 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.