Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127100
Authors: 
Nakamura, Tomoya
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 908
Abstract: 
This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower is determined by the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty. If the weight is sufficiently low (high), then the relationship is a strategic substitute (complement), and the leader has a first-mover (dis)advantage, respectively. In the case of strategic complementarity, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.
Subjects: 
Stackelberg games
Cournot games
First-mover and second-mover advantages
Public and private information
JEL: 
C72
D82
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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