Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127093 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 914
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that perspective. A key departure is that we consider a case where the authority relationship is defined only by the allocation of responsibility via contingent contracts. Within this framework, we show that the contractual arrangement which allocates responsibility asymmetrically often emerges as the optimal organizational form, which gives rise to the chain of command pertaining to hierarchical organizations.
Schlagwörter: 
Authority
Responsibility
Contract
Cheap-talk communication
Information acquisition
JEL: 
D03
D99
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
257.74 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.