Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127088
Authors: 
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 902
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit solutions. (ii) We provide a complete characterisation of such equilibria and compare quality, price and expected scores across first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of the scoring rule and the distribution function of types.
JEL: 
D44
H57
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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