Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127085
Authors: 
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 931
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, "budget-balance", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (2) strategy-proofness, "equal rights lower bound", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (3) strategy-proofness, "envy- freeness, no-trade-no-transfer", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability.
Subjects: 
Strategy-proofness
Probabilistic allocation problem
Second price trading rule
Budget-balance
Second best efficiency
JEL: 
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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