Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127083
Authors: 
Tamura, Shohei
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 925
The ISER-Moriguchi Prize Awarded Paper 17
Abstract: 
We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.
Subjects: 
Institutional design
Award rule
Conflict of interest
Impartiality
Plurality correspondence
JEL: 
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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