Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127075
Authors: 
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 947
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires that each demander (i.e., agent whose most preferred amount is strictly greater than his endowment) should not envy another demander who does not receive his endowment and that each supplier (i.e., agent whose most preferred amount is strictly less than his endowment) should not envy another supplier who does not receive his endowment. We establish that a rule is efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, and position-wise envy-free if and only if it is the "gradual uniform rule," which is an extension of the well-known uniform rule.
Subjects: 
Envy-freeness
Individual rationality
Uniform rule
Single-peaked preferences
Strategy-proofness
JEL: 
D71
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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