Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127071
Authors: 
Aoyagi, Masaki
Bhaskar, V.
Frechette, Guillaume R.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 942
Abstract: 
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ substantially in the three treatments. Specifically, we observe that the strategies are more complex under public and private monitoring than under perfect monitoring. We also find that the strategies under private monitoring are more lenient than under perfect monitoring, and less forgiving than under public monitoring.
Subjects: 
infinitely repeated games
monitoring
perfect
public
private
experiments
JEL: 
C72
C73
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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