Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126657
Authors: 
Borcan, Oana
Lindahl, Mikael
Mitrut, Andreea
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9561
Abstract: 
We investigate the distributional consequences of a corruption-fighting initiative in Romania targeting the endemic fraud in a high-stakes high school exit exam, which introduced CCTV monitoring of the exam and credible punishment threats for teachers and students. We find that the campaign was effective in reducing corruption and, in particular, that monitoring increased the effectiveness of the punishment threats. Estimating the heterogeneous impact for students of different poverty status we show that curbing corruption led to a worrisome score gap increase between poor and non-poor students. Consequently, the poor students have reduced chances to enter an elite university.
Subjects: 
corruption
high-stakes exam
bribes
monitoring and punishment
JEL: 
I21
I24
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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