Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/126595 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 202
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We measure the welfare consequences of endogenous quality choice in imperfectly competitive markets. We introduce the concept of a "quality markup" and measure the relative welfare consequences of market power over price and quality. For U.S. paid-television markets during 1997-2006, we find that not only are cable monopolists' prices 33% to 74% higher than marginal costs, but qualities are also 23% to 55% higher than socially optimal and the welfare costs of each are similar in magnitude. Such evidence for "quality inflation" by monopolists is at odds with classic results in the literature.
Schlagwörter: 
industrial organization
endogenous quality
imperfect competition
monopoly
cable television
pay television
welfare
quality markup
JEL: 
L15
L13
L82
L96
C51
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
944.27 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.