Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126591
Authors: 
Kushnir, Alexey
Liu, Shuo
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 212
Abstract: 
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
Subjects: 
Bayesian implementation
dominant strategy implementation
mechanism design
non-linear utilities
single-crossing
JEL: 
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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