Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126524
Authors: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Gangadharan, Lata
Jones, Kristy
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-021
Abstract: 
Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Different donor types emerge: 41 per-cent of all donors reduce their donation in response to intermediation, 59 per-cent of all donors give as much or more with than without intermediation. The price of charitable output does not explain these types and appears to only matter after taking characteristics of donors´ moral judgement into account.
Subjects: 
altruism
charitable giving
charitable institutions
intermediation
moral judgement reasoning
price elasticity
JEL: 
C91
D64
L31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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