Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126517
Autor:innen: 
Engel, Christoph
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Datum: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2015/15
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.
Schlagwörter: 
dictator game
uncertainty
donation
JEL: 
D81
C91
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
631.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.