Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126517
Authors: 
Engel, Christoph
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015/15
Abstract: 
Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.
Subjects: 
dictator game
uncertainty
donation
JEL: 
D81
C91
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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