Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/126516 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2015/19
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as "stealing" and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.
Schlagwörter: 
coase theorem
absolute vs. relative right
bargaining
efficiency
distribution
fairness
JEL: 
C91
D01
D02
D03
D47
D61
K11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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