Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126516
Authors: 
Bar-Gill, Oren
Engel, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015/19
Abstract: 
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as "stealing" and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.
Subjects: 
coase theorem
absolute vs. relative right
bargaining
efficiency
distribution
fairness
JEL: 
C91
D01
D02
D03
D47
D61
K11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
469.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.