Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125930
Authors: 
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 209
Abstract: 
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.
Subjects: 
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Signalling
JEL: 
L13
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-208-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
394.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.