Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/125793 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 207
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.
Schlagwörter: 
Margin squeeze
Predatory pricing
Price-cost test
Abuse of dominance
JEL: 
K21
L12
L43
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-206-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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