Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125130
Authors: 
Schmittdiel, Heiner
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-128/VII
Abstract: 
In this paper, we develop a model that can explain why governments may want to choose to offer a voluntary disclosure program that allows people who withheld taxes to turn themselves in without punishment. We find that such a leniency rule not only increases government revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when taxpayers anticipate it.
Subjects: 
Tax compliance
voluntary disclosure
guilt
JEL: 
H26
K34
K40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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