Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125123
Authors: 
Estévez-Fernández, A.
Borm, P.
Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.
Mosquera, M.A.
Sánchez-Rodríguez, E.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-123/II
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann-Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985} in this sense. From this result, not only necessary conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, but also necessary and sufficient conditions such that the 1-nucleolus and the compromise value of exact games coincide.
Subjects: 
1-nucleolus
Compromise stable games
Exact games
Aumann-Maschler rule
Nucleolus
Compromise value
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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