Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125087
Authors: 
Hassink, Wolter H.J.
Koning, Pierre
Zwinkels, Wim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-081/V
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes selection and incentive effects of opting out from public to private insurance on employer Disability Insurance (DI) inflow rates. We use administrative information on DI benefit costs and opting-out decisions of a balanced panel of about 140,000 employers that are observed between 2007 and 2011. We argue that the opting-out decision of employers was driven by current DI enrolment and anticipation effects that resulted from short-term expectations on DI costs. In particular, employers opted out when this was most rewarding for them in reducing DI premium rates. When controlling for these effects, our main finding is that there are no incentive effects due to opting out. Thus, publicly and privately insured employers show similar DI inflow rates.
Subjects: 
Public versus private insurance
Disability insurance
Opting out
Longitudinal analyses
JEL: 
C23
I13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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