Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125082
Authors: 
Zeng, Yuyu
Houba, Harold
van der Laan, Gerard
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-080/II
Abstract: 
We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.
Subjects: 
Competition economics
two-sided market
JEL: 
D4
L4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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