Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125075
Authors: 
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) 76
Abstract: 
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as a quantitative measure of how regular a distribution is. L-regularity includes Myerson regularity and the monotone hazard rate condition as special cases. We show that L-regularity implies sharp bounds on various key quantities in auction theory, thus extending several recent findings from quantitative auction and mechanism design.
Subjects: 
L-regularity
Myerson regularity
Monotone Hazard Rate
Auctions
Mechanism Design
Approximation
JEL: 
D44
D47
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.