Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125031
Authors: 
Feicht, Robert
Grimm, Veronika
Rau, Holger A.
Stephan, Gesine
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9506
Abstract: 
We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.
Subjects: 
multi person ultimatum game
dictator game
collective decisions
experiments
JEL: 
C92
C72
C78
J31
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.39 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.