Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/124976
Authors: 
Woo, Seokjin
Lee, Soohyung
Kim, Kyunghee
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9458
Abstract: 
A key concern in the design of education policies relates to the structure of incentives in accountability systems. This paper examines a school accountability program that provides financial support to low-performing schools but has no direct punishment scheme for recipients who do not exhibit improvement. Although the program does not include high-stakes consequences, our estimates indicate that the program reduced the share of underperforming students by 18 percent. This paper's results suggest that to improve student achievement, a school accountability program does not need to set high-stakes consequences that potentially induce unwanted strategic behaviors on the part of school workers.
Subjects: 
school accountability
student achievement
school performance
fuzzy regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
C5
I2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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