Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123488 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EPRI Working Paper No. 2013-3
Verlag: 
The University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), London (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
Does a central bank that is independent of political influence deliver a better macroeconomic performance than one that implements monetary policy decisions taken by government? Does an inflation targeting agreement between central bank and government improve macroeconomic performance? And does the combination of an independent central bank and inflation targeting deliver an even better performance than either on its own? This paper addresses these questions by examining the outcomes of some natural experiments. [...]
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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