Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123476
Authors: 
Nöldeke, Georg
Peña, Jorge
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Working Paper 2015/08
Abstract: 
We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results con rm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.
Subjects: 
Costly voting
Participation games
Mixed strategy equilibrium
Polynomials in Bernstein form
JEL: 
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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