Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123469 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Discussion Paper No. 2015/01
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case) all increasing decision functions are implementable under a single crossing condition, and to obtain an existence result for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model.
Schlagwörter: 
Implementation
Duality
Galois Connection
Imperfectly Transferable Utility
Principal-Agent Model
Two-Sided Matching
JEL: 
C62
C78
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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