Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123453 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Discussion Paper No. 2013/09
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2012. It holds when controlling for legislators' ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, pursue their business interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators' identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.
Schlagwörter: 
Lawyers
legislatures
rent-seeking
tort law
tort reform
voting behavior
JEL: 
D72
K13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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