Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123389
Authors: 
Braendle, Thomas
Stutzer, Alois
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Working Paper 07/08
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a con ict of interest. We present a cost-bene t calculus and analyze speci c legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we nd that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
Subjects: 
Political selection
parliamentary election
public servants
incompatibility
JEL: 
D72
D73
H11
H83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
460.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.