Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123175 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5527
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We argue a holdout is not a destructive investor behaviour but a rational investment decision. This investment decision is characterised by the mean-variance approach. We investigate intercreditor conflict by diverse portfolio structure. We demonstrate that at some point during the Greek (2012) and Argentine (2005) debt restructuring programs it was reasonable for the investor to hold out. This model shows that the investment decision is based on the portfolio structure, risk aversion and expected payment of the debtor, so there is no free-rider behaviour. On the contrary, the investor harms herself when playing a destructive or uncooperative strategy.
Schlagwörter: 
sovereign debt
holdout
mean-variance approach
collective action clause
JEL: 
G18
H50
H63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
563.02 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.