Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123145
Authors: 
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5501
Abstract: 
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.
Subjects: 
auctions
information release
information partitions
order statistics
stochastic orders
dispersion
dispersive order
excess wealth order
JEL: 
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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