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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 745
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We prove that, in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect information, a continuous-time best response dynamic always converges to a Nash equilibrium component. We show the robustness of convergence by an approximate best response dynamic: whatever the initial state and an allowed approximate best response dynamic, the state is close to the set of Nash equilibria most of the time. In a perfect-information game where each player can only move at one node, we prove that all interior approximate best response dynamics converge to the backward induction equilibrium, which is hence the socially stable strategy in the game.
Schlagwörter: 
convergence to Nash equilibrium
games in extensive form
games of perfect information
Nash equilibrium components
best response dynamics
fictitious play
socially stable strategy
JEL: 
C73
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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