Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122090
Authors: 
Davis, Douglas
Ivanov, Asen
Korenok, Oleg
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 727
Abstract: 
We introduce a novel approach to studying behavior in repeated games - one that is based on the psychology of play. Our approach is based on the following six "aspects" of a player's behavior: round-1 cooperation, lenience, forgiveness, loyalty, leadership, and following. Using a laboratory experiment, we explore how aspects are correlated between each other in a given repeated game, how they are correlated with behavior at various histories in a given repeated game, and how each aspect is correlated across different repeated games. We also investigate whether two players' aspects from a given repeated game tend to predict the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome if these two players are matched to play either the same kind of repeated game or an altogether different repeated game. An important feature of our study is that it addresses the question of cross-game prediction.
Subjects: 
Repeated games
Prisoner's dilemma
Experiment
Cooperation
JEL: 
C92
D03
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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