Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122087
Authors: 
Davis, Douglas
Ivanov, Asen
Korenok, Oleg
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 728
Abstract: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject's patience, gender, altruism, and compliance with first-order stochastic dominance have some limited systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject's patience, gender, and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.
Subjects: 
Experiment
Repeated game
Individual characteristics
JEL: 
C91
C92
D03
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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