Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122039
Authors: 
Cotton, Christopher
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1344
Abstract: 
We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy outcomes and contributions depend on policymaker constraints and the design of the "Contest for Attention." Among other results, awarding attention to the highest contributors generally guarantees the first best policy outcome. It can also lead to the highest possible contributions, suggesting that a policymaker may not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions.
Subjects: 
all-pay auction
rent seeking
handicapped contest
political access
lobbying
JEL: 
D44
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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