Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/122017 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2015-036
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between finance and marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this effect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are characterized that induce efficient screening, while preventing moral hazard. "All-or-nothing" reward-crowdfunding platforms reflect salient features of these mechanisms. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected gross returns exceed twice expected investment costs. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. With limited consumer reach, crowdfunders become actual investors. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing, because each financing mode displays a different strength.
Schlagwörter: 
crowdfunding
finance
marketing
demand uncertainty
moral hazard
JEL: 
D82
G32
L11
M31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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