Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121592 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 1980
Verlag: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Zusammenfassung (übersetzt): 
This paper explores how malapportionment affects the way Brazilian federal government allocates its resources to subnational units. Specifically, we argue that over-represented subnational units receive more per capita in discretionary federal spending because the executive seeks its legislative support. Using data from 1997 to 2010, we propose and evaluate a model for explaining discretionary federal spending. The findings support the hypothesis that over-represented subnational units receive more than under-represented ones, presumably because the central government strategically target them to gain legislative support.
Schlagwörter: 
malapportionment
Executive-Legislative relations
fiscal federalism
Brazil
JEL: 
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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