Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121592
Authors: 
Turgeon, Mathieu
Cavalcante, Pedro
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 1980
Abstract (Translated): 
This paper explores how malapportionment affects the way Brazilian federal government allocates its resources to subnational units. Specifically, we argue that over-represented subnational units receive more per capita in discretionary federal spending because the executive seeks its legislative support. Using data from 1997 to 2010, we propose and evaluate a model for explaining discretionary federal spending. The findings support the hypothesis that over-represented subnational units receive more than under-represented ones, presumably because the central government strategically target them to gain legislative support.
Subjects: 
malapportionment
Executive-Legislative relations
fiscal federalism
Brazil
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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