Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121441 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Research Papers in Economics No. 11/15
Verlag: 
Universität Trier, Fachbereich IV – Volkswirtschaftslehre, Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is associated with a greater intensity of applicant screening. In establishments without increased multitasking, it is associated with a reduced intensity. The findings fit the hypothesis that performance pay induces a positive self-sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers using performance pay need no intense applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, performance pay can entail problems of adverse selfsorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers tying pay to performance screen applicants more intensely.
Schlagwörter: 
performance pay
multitasking
self-sorting
applicant screening
non-managerial employees
managerial employees
JEL: 
J33
J60
M51
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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